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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, and especially in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, an increasing 
number of countries have been introducing some form of explicit deposit guarantees, and such 
arrangements are now widespread around the world. The G-22 Working Party on strengthening 
Financial Systems has recommended introduction of explicit deposit insurance, and the Financial 
Stability Forum has formed a working group to develop international guidelines for deposit 
insurance. More recently, Hong Kong SAR has begun deliberations on the design of a guarantee 
scheme, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is planning a revision of the 
deposit insurance scheme in the United States. Moreover, deposit protection arrangements have 
been harmonized across the European Union (EU).  
 
The wide acceptance of the need for a deposit guarantee scheme does not, however, reflect a 
belief that the moral hazard implications of such schemes are negligible and can be ignored. 
Rather, it more likely represents a view that moral hazard is a smaller price to pay—at least in 
the short run—than the costs arising from the systemic risk implications of bank runs or bank 
failures in the absence of  deposit guarantees.
2 In other words, although essentially an empirical 
question, the net effect of deposit insurance is perceived to be an increase in banking system 
stability.  
 
The ways in which moral hazard resulting from a deposit guarantee scheme manifests itself are 
well known. First, deposit insurance provides an incentive for banks to select more risky (and 
potentially more profitable) portfolio strategies, without having to pay higher interest rates to 
compensate depositors for the additional risk. Thus the guarantee scheme may encourage 
excessive risk taking by banks. Second, depositors, confident in the protection provided by the 
insurance scheme, have less incentive to monitor bank managers’ behavior, or to engage in flight 
to quality. Third, supervisory forbearance may rise as bank supervisors,  assuming that liquidity 
crises are unlikely in the face of deposit insurance, may become reluctant to  require prompt 
corrective actions by weak institutions (Garcia, 1999). Indeed, irrespective of the net effects of a 
deposit insurance scheme on financial system stability, there is a rather unambiguous theoretical 
finding that such schemes could encourage risk taking by banks (Merton, 1977; Kareken and 
Wallace, 1978; Gennotte and Pyle, 1991; Boot and Greenbaum, 1993; Matutes and Vives, 1996, 
2000).  
 
Against the background of these theoretical findings, much work has focused on specific features 
of a deposit insurance scheme that could help reduce the moral hazard implications of the safety 
net. However, the available proposal falls short of alleviating the main concerns mentioned 
                                                 
2 More generally, it is sometimes argued that the adverse side effects of regulation in general 
often dominate its beneficial effects (Schwartz 1995, Black 1995, Kaufman 1998). Despite all 
the regulations, or perhaps, some might say, because of them, 118 of IMF member countries (out 
of 184) have encountered systemic banking crises.  
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above. The design of a deposit guarantee scheme that reduces systemic risk and contagion but 
does not lead to excessive risk taking by banks remains a challenge.  
 
The previous work in this area indicates that improving the market-oriented features of the 
scheme enhances its effectiveness in the above sense. The proposal for a market-oriented deposit 
insurance scheme (MODIS) outlined in this paper is a step in that direction. The proposal seeks 
to minimize banks’ risk-taking, while avoiding some of the main pitfalls of the alternatives 
proposed.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on the moral 
hazard consequences of deposit guarantees to distill the lessons of the previous studies on 
reducing incentives for risk-taking by banks associated with deposit insurance schemes. 
Section III describes the features of the MODIS proposal and presents a model for determination 
of the optimal deposit insurance coverage ratio. A comparison of the MODIS proposal with its 
precursors and the prevailing practice in the United States is provided in Section IV, and some 
concluding remarks are presented in Section V. 
 
II.   THE MORAL HAZARD IMPLICATIONS OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
 
A.   Theory and Empirical Evidence 
 
The theoretical justification for deposit insurance is presented in a seminal paper by Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983). They demonstrate that the existence of demand deposits can lead to multiple 
equilibria, including one with bank runs. As the latter may cause the failure of sound banks and 
real economic damage, a deposit insurance system that can rule out massive withdrawals 
produces a superior outcome. According to Bryant (1980), deposit liabilities backed by risky 
assets, together with asymmetric information on these assets, may lead to bank runs. Under the 
assumption of illiquidity costs, a government deposit insurance system can redistribute risk in a 
way that is not available to the private economy, although it cannot necessarily keep a bank run 
from occurring. Bryant (1981), modeling bank runs as the collapse of a fiat money system, 
shows that such collapses, which reduces production and employment, can be avoided with the 
introduction of deposit guarantees. In Matutes and Vives (1996), self-fulfilling depositor 
expectations in the presence of economies of scale yield multiple equilibria, some of which 
involve individual or systemic bank failures. Against this background, deposit insurance, by 
preventing systemic confidence crises, and causing an expansion of the deposit base, can be 
welfare improving. 
The conclusions of these papers regarding the superiority of the steady state in the presence of 
deposit insurance depend crucially on the assumptions that bank runs will lead to large-scale  
bank failures and therefore major disruptions in output. These papers do not consider the 
possibility that the moral hazard implications of deposit insurance could also lead to bank 
failures (although not through deposit runs). Once this possibility is recognized, a case for 
deposit insurance could be made only if the probability of bank failures resulting from deposit 
insurance is lower compared to the probability of experiencing contagious bank runs. Given that   - 5 - 
the measurement of these probabilities is an almost impossible task, prudence dictates that the 
deposit insurance scheme be designed to minimize the cost of moral hazard. 
Another strand of the literature, which is more relevant to the objective of this paper, has focused 
on the repercussions of deposit guarantee schemes in general, or certain specific features of the 
scheme, on banks’ risk-taking. Matutes and Vives (1996) argue that depositor protection 
schemes may encourage fiercer competition for deposits, thereby increasing banks’ failure 
probabilities, and producing a larger deadweight loss for the economy. Gennotte and Pyle (1991) 
show that deposit insurance, by allowing banks to borrow at a subsidized rate, encourages both 
risk-taking and inefficient investment.  
 
Foremost among the features of deposit insurance schemes considered by the theoretical 
literature is the flat-premium feature whereby all banks pay the same contribution rate 
irrespective of the riskiness of their portfolios. Kareken and Wallace (1978) show that, under a 
flat-premium deposit insurance arrangement, banks hold a portfolio which is at least as risky as 
regulations allow. Matutes and Vives (2000) illustrate how deposit insurance with flat premia 
tends to make banks more aggressive competitors in setting rates to attract depositors, and 
induces them to take maximal asset risk positions.
3 Boot and Greenbaum (1993) also show that 
banks’ credit monitoring is lower in a system of fixed-premia deposit insurance, than in the 
absence of a deposit guarantee. Merton (1977) shows that deposit insurance is equivalent to a put 
option, and uses option pricing to derive the cost of flat-premium insurance to the guarantor. He 
then proves that  this cost increases with the volatility of the value of banks’ assets during the 
term of the deposits.
4 Chami, Fullenkamp, and Sharma (2002) argue that banks, holding a call 
option that comes from the standard deposit contract and a put option granted through deposit 
insurance, are effectively holding a straddle and therefore can profit from volatility (risk taking), 
making the insurance scheme funded by flat premium unviable.  
 
1. Risk-adjusted insurance premia 
 
On the other hand, there is some evidence in the literature that risk-based insurance pricing 
alleviates moral hazard. Matutes and Vives (2000) show that risk-adjusted premia, paid after 
banks’ decisions on asset risk have been taken, reduce incentives for hazardous portfolio 
strategies and generate lower failure rates.
5 Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998) demonstrate that 
risk-based contributions enhance banks’ incentive to monitor their own risk position, provided 
that the risk information is fully disclosed to the insurance agency. 
                                                 
3 Similar results are obtained in Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998). 
4 This result has been extended to take into account audit costs (Merton, 1978), liquidation costs 
(Mullins and Pyle, 1991), and interest risk (McCullough, 1981; Kerfriden and Rochet, 1993). 
5 Nevertheless, even with risk-adjusted premiums, deposit rates may be too high, and welfare 
may be improved by introducing deposit limits or rate regulation.   - 6 - 
There is evidence to the contrary as well, suggesting that risk-sensitive premia may generate 
detrimental effects on banks’ portfolio decisions. Pennacchi (1987) shows that with risk-adjusted 
contributions, the degree of risk-taking depends on the resolution strategy in the event of bank 
failure. Specifically, if the insuring agency followed a policy of resolving failures by extending 
direct payments to depositors, monopoly rents (charter values) would induce banks to take less 
risk and increase their capital. On the other hand, if the insuring agency pursued a resolution 
strategy involving purchase and assumption or merger, banks charged with risk-sensitive premia 
would still tend to take excessive risks. Also, Dewatripont and Tirole (1993b) point out that risk-
based pricing may induce perverse effects on banks’ risk-taking, if the higher cost of deposit 
insurance further reduces bank solvency.  
 
The theoretical literature unambiguously shows that explicit deposit insurance generates 
incentives for excessive risk-taking by banks, but the empirical evidence on the subject is 
mixed.
6 For example, Thies and Gerlowski (1989) and Wheelock (1992) find a positive 
relationship between deposit insurance and increased risk taking of U.S. banks in the 1920s. 
Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997, 2000) find that deposit insurance raised the 
probability of bank failures in a panel of more than 60 countries during the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, Wheelock and Wilson (1994) and Alston, Grove, and Wheelock (1994) do not find a 
significant relationship between the rate of U.S. bank failures and deposit insurance, and Karels 
and McClatchy (1999) show that the adoption of deposit insurance is not associated with higher 
risk-taking by the U.S. credit unions during 1971–90. Also, analyzing the U.S. thrift industry in 
the 1930s, Grossman (1992) shows that newly insured thrifts undertook less risk than their 
uninsured counterparts, although the difference in risk-taking diminished as the length of time an 
institution was insured increased.  
One limitation of these studies, which could possibly explain the inconclusiveness of their 
results, is that most of them overlook a number of factors that can alter the moral hazard 
implications of deposit insurance, as suggested by the theoretical literature. As a result, the 
estimates may suffer from the omitted variable bias.
7 First, the risk-taking effects of deposit 
insurance may be mitigated by the amount of uninsured (subordinated) debt on banks’ balance 
sheets that fosters effective monitoring by debt holders (Dewatripoint and Tirole, 1993a, b; 
Calomiris, 1999). Second, risk-taking behavior is influenced by bank franchise value.
8 A 
depository institution with high charter value has no incentive to risk failure, because its owners 
could not sell the charter if the bank were declared insolvent (Keeley, 1990; Demsetz, 
Saidenberg, and Strahan, 1996). Banks’ franchise value depends on market power (Keeley, 
                                                 
6 For a review of empirical studies prior to 1990, see Gilbert (1990). 
7 An exception is represented by the recent paper by Gropp and Vesala (2001). 
8 Franchise value (or charter value) is the present value of the stream of profits that a company or 
a bank is expected to earn (Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan, 1996).    - 7 - 
1990), reputation (Boot and Greenbaum, 1993), and relationship with the client (Besanko and 
Thakor, 1993). All these factors may lessen the moral hazard consequences of deposit insurance.  
Another weakness of the above empirical studies is that they focus exclusively on explicit 
deposit insurance, without taking into account the consequences of implicit guarantees. Clearly, 
whenever an implicit system of deposit protection is already in place, the expected impact of the 
introduction of explicit insurance on risk-taking is likely to be ambiguous. For example, the risk-
taking decisions of banks that are viewed as ‘too big to fail’ may not be sensitive to deposit 
insurance, if such banks consider themselves to be the beneficiaries of an implicit comprehensive 
safety net. In such cases, explicit but limited, deposit insurance may be a useful way to reduce 
the safety net, and hence moral hazard (Gropp and Vesala, 2001). Again, as the empirical 
evidence on the moral hazard of deposit protection is mixed, it would be prudent for any 
supervisory agency to try to design a deposit insurance scheme that would not raise the specter of 
moral hazard. 
 
B.   Reducing the Moral Hazard Implications of Deposit Insurance 
 
Several proposals have been put forward to help reduce the risk-taking consequences of deposit 
protection. These include, in addition to risk-adjusted insurance premia discussed above, 
tightening the capital requirements for banks that make banks internalize the cost of increased 
risk; “narrow banking,” according to which the maturity structure of bank assets should be 
perfectly matched with that of their liabilities; and enforcing stronger market discipline, whereby 
depositors or other creditors are induced to monitor banks’ portfolio decisions. These proposals, 
while helpful, suffer from various drawbacks that limit their effectiveness in reducing moral 
hazard, as explained below.
9 
 
1. More stringent capital requirements 
 
In principle, banks that are better capitalized can be expected to be less prone to risky strategies, 
as they have more to lose in the event of failure (Furlong and Keeley, 1987; 1989). This 
observation could mean that more stringent capital regulations reduce risk-taking incentives (and 
hence the expected liability of the deposit insurance system). However, a distinction has to be 
made between banks that maintain a high level of capital voluntarily and those that hold higher 
levels of capital only if required by regulators. Risk aversion may not be much affected by 
increased capital requirements on the latter group. Indeed, some models indicate that a tightening 
of the capital constraint may reduce the total volume of risky portfolio, while, at the same time, 
raising the fraction of portfolio invested in risky assets (Kim and Santomero, 1988; Gennotte and 
Pyle; 1991, Rochet, 1992). Therefore, the theoretical implications of more stringent capital 
regulations remain ambiguous.  
 
                                                 
9 Additional proposals, including creating a private deposit insurance, or relying on independent 
rating agencies to induce managerial discipline, are discussed in Dewatripont and Tirole (1993b).   - 8 - 
 
2. Narrow banking  
 
Under this proposal, banks should be required to back insured deposits with marketable, low-risk 
assets, and allowed to do what they want with the uninsured portion of their liabilities. In 
practice, narrow banking eliminates the safety net, as government insurance would have to be 
provided only in the unlikely event of bank losses on very low-risk, marketable securities 
(Calomiris, 1999). One problem with this approach is that the part of the bank that carries out the 
essential lending activities, on which enterprises and other borrowers depend, is not protected. 
Therefore, bank runs on uninsured deposits, and subsequent credit crunches, would still be 
possible. 
 
3. Market discipline 
 
Another method to minimize the potential moral hazard cost of deposit insurance is the so-called 
“market-discipline approach.” This proposal combines government deposit insurance with 
market-driven enforcement of prudent bank behavior. It assumes that market participants 
(depositors and bank creditors) are able to process information, and have the incentive to 
monitor, as well as punish, excessive risk-taking. In practice, effective depositor monitoring of 
banking activity can be achieved only under certain conditions (Barajas and Steiner, 2000; 
Birchler and Maechler, 2002; Calomiris and Powell, 2000; Mantripragada, 1992). First, there 
must be a group of depositors for whom risk is a major concern in choosing a bank. Second, 
banks must be allowed to fail, with consequent losses for depositors. Third, banks must disclose, 
and depositors must have access to relevant information on the banks’ activities and balance 
sheets. The depositors must be able to analyze and derive conclusions from the data, or there 
must be analysts who advise them on the condition of the banks. Fourth, the discipline imposed 
by depositors has to be severe enough to affect banks’ decisions, but not so drastic as to lead to 
disruptive runs, involving the whole financial system. Finally, the banking system has to be 
fundamentally sound. These conditions are usually difficult to achieve, although not impossible 
as indicated by the case of New Zealand.  
 
Prominent among the proposals to enhance market discipline in deposit insurance systems are (a) 
providing insurance only to small depositors and (b) requiring banks to hold a minimum amount 
of subordinated debt (sub-debt). These proposals are discussed below.  
 
a. Covering only small depositors  
 
Clearly, the smaller the ratio of deposits covered by deposit insurance, the less resulting moral 
hazard and the higher the incentive for the larger depositors to monitor the activities of the bank 
(Garcia, 1999). The problem, however, is that this approach to deposit insurance leaves out the 
all-too-important issue of determining the coverage ratio that allows market discipline and serves 
as a deterrence to bank runs. Moreover, insurance limits are effective only if depositors cannot 
circumvent them by spreading deposits across various institutions or different types of deposits. 
An alternative of this approach, the coinsurance systems (whereby the insurance agency and 
depositor share losses in a specified proportion), may be too complex for an average depositor to   - 9 - 
understand. Another variant of this approach is to require a deductible on the amount of deposits 
covered. However, such deductibles are regressive as small depositors are placed at a relative 
disadvantage. It is unlikely that such schemes can discourage bank runs (Mantripragada, 1992).  
 
b. Mandatory subordinated debt 
 
This proposal involves requiring banks to maintain a minimum amount of subordinated debt, 
thereby providing a cushion to absorb losses and reducing the expected costs of bank failure for 
the deposit insurance agency. The proponents of sub-debt argue that it could alleviate the moral 
hazard implications of deposit insurance for several reasons.
10 First, since sub-debt is uninsured, 
its price is sensitive to the risk of the issuing bank. This should force depository institutions to 
take into account the impact of their risk-taking decisions on funding costs (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, 1983; Horvitz, 1986). Second, institutions that take on excessive risk, or 
that manage their portfolio poorly, would find it difficult to sell their sub-debt, and would have to 
shrink their risky assets or issue new capital. Calomiris (1999) suggests imposing monthly 
rollovers on sub-debt. Banks that are unable to issue sub-debt at rates below a certain cap would 
be required to reduce their risky assets. Third, banks’ ability to place sub-debt, and the issue 
prices, would be important signals for market participants and supervisors thereby reducing 
forbearance (Cooper and Fraser, 1988; Evanoff, 1993).
11 Fourth, as sub-debt holders are exposed 
to losses, but do not benefit from the upside gains resulting from risky strategies, they would 
have a strong incentive to monitor banks and demand full information disclosure. Fifth, 
subordinated debt holders, unlike small depositors, are supposed to be sophisticated enough to 
exercise careful oversight of banks.
12  
There is some empirical evidence on some of these purported benefits of sub-debt proposals. A 
number of studies have found that subordinated debt holders demand higher returns from riskier 
banks indicating that there is some evidence of a link between asset risk and banks’ funding 
costs. However, there is also some evidence that lack of information can jeopardize the market’s 
                                                 
10 The proposals on the use of sub-debt as a device to encourage market discipline have found an 
echo in the proposal for reforming bank capital regulations presented by the U.S. Shadow 
Regulatory Committee (2000), and in the Report by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System and the Treasury Department to the Congress on the “Feasibility and 
Desirability of Mandatory Subordinated Debt” (2000). Both these reports conclude that 
mandatory subordinated debt issuance may enhance market discipline and bank soundness. 
11 This effect is referred to as derived discipline, while the impact of sub-debt issues on banks’ 
cost of funding is regarded as direct discipline. 
12 Surveys of the different sub-debt proposals, and of the empirical studies on the effectiveness of 
subordinated debt to enhance market discipline, are presented in Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (1999), Evanoff and Wall (2000), and Lang and Robertson (2000). For a 
theoretical discussion, see also Dewatripont and Tirole (1993b).    - 10 - 
attempts to price risk accurately. Can market participants make more accurate assessments of a 
bank’s conditions than institutional supervisors? Some of the information available to regulators 
becomes known to the market with a substantial lag, thus casting doubt on whether the market 
can be a better bank watchdog than institutional supervisors. Also, the sub-debt requirement 
turns the straddle position the banks hold (when there is deposit insurance) to a strangle,
13 which 
means that sub-debt may not necessarily reduce banks’ incentive to take excessive risk (Chami, 
Fullenkamp and Sharma 2002).  
 
III.   PROPOSAL FOR A MARKET-ORIENTED DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME 
 
The proposals discussed in the previous section do not fully address the objective of minimizing 
the incentive for risk-taking inherent in deposit insurance programs. Most of these proposals 
either have ambiguous theoretical implications, or suffer from practical implementation 
problems. Against this background, this section proposes a market-oriented deposit insurance 
scheme (MODIS) that builds on the previous proposals to reduce the moral hazard implications 
of such safety nets. Similar to some of the other proposals, MODIS is based on the belief that the 
market discipline approach provides the most likely scenario for minimizing the potential moral 
hazard costs of deposit insurance.
14 As explained below (and Box 1), the distinctive feature of 
MODIS is that it relies almost completely on market forces to deter excessive risk taking by 
banks. The basic objective of MODIS is not to prevent all bank failures, but to contribute to the 
soundness of the financial system, by making it less likely that a nonsystemic problem in the 
banking system becomes systemic. MODIS would do so by providing a measure of protection to 
depositors, while making them also responsible for their own financial actions. 
 
A.   The Main Features of  MODIS 
 
1. An uninsured deposit portion 
 
The purpose of the two-tier deposit structure is to ensure that banks are subject to market 
discipline. Both the theoretical literature and several empirical studies show that uncovered 
depositors, who could suffer from losses in the event of bank failure, would impose discipline on 
banks, demanding higher deposit rates from riskier institutions and shifting their funds to safer 
banks, thereby penalizing risk-taking. Matutes and Vives (2000) show that, in the presence of 
depositors sophisticated enough to realize how deposit rates and investments affect the 
probability of bank failures, banks with more risky portfolios set a higher deposit rate than their 
competitors. The empirical studies of the U.S. banking system find evidence that riskier 
                                                 
13 In the terminology of option theory, strangle means a long position in both a call and a put, 
with different strike prices. In the above context, the difference between the strike prices results 
from the existence of sub-debt. 
14 A comparison between MODIS and other market based discipline approaches is presented in 
Section IV.   - 11 - 
institutions pay a higher premium on uninsured large denomination CDs (Baer and Brewer, 
1986; Rolnick, 1987; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; James, 1988, 1990; Cargill, 1989, and 
Keeley, 1990), and attract smaller amounts of these deposits, compared to more sound banks 
(Park, 1995; Goldberg and Hudgins, 1996; Park and Peristiani, 1998; Marino and Bennett, 1999). 
 
 
  Box 1. Summary of the Main Features of MODIS 
 
1.  Banks can issue two types of deposits: tier 1 and tier 2. Tier 1 deposits are fully 
guaranteed by a government-run deposit insurance system. Tier 2 deposits are 
explicitly denied such protection. Tier 2 deposits can be redeemed before maturity 
only at a penalty. 
2.  Depositors can choose how to allocate their deposits between the two tiers. There is 
no upper limit on either tier 1 or tier 2 deposits. Banks can compete for either type 
of deposits by raising interest rates. 
3.  Banks are required to publicly display the size of their tier 1 deposits as a 
percentage of total deposits (henceforth, tier 1 ratio), and their ratings awarded by 
the banking supervisory agency (henceforth, safety stars). 
4.  Each bank pays a deposit insurance premium, which depends positively on both the 
volume of its tier 1 deposits and the spread between its tier 2 and tier 1 deposit 
interest rates. 
5.  Banks will be required to hold additional capital over and above the usual (BIS-
related) standards, the size of which will depend on their interest rate spreads, 
safety stars, and tier 1 ratio.  
6.  A bank may be subject to intensified supervision depending on the size of its tier 1 




There is, however, a potential problem with such a two-tier system of insured and uninsured 
deposits. If depositors could easily switch funds from one tier to the other, they would do so on 
the first signs or impression of trouble in a bank (or the banking system, for that matter). If this 
were the case, however, the benefits of market discipline would be lost. The distinction between 
insured and uninsured deposits would become meaningless and uninsured depositors would 
assume that their deposits too are implicitly guaranteed. To minimize this possibility, under 
MODIS, tier 2 deposits can be redeemed before maturity only at a penalty.
15 The size of the 
penalty should be established to be a clear deterrence against early withdrawals. 
                                                 
15 Since penalty on early withdrawal cannot be applied to demand deposits, these deposits should 
be included in tier 1.   - 12 - 
The existence of uninsured deposits in the system brings about the risk of bank runs. There are 
two aspects to this issue. The runs may reflect a flight to quality, which is the cornerstone of 
market discipline to impose prudent behavior on banks. The runs can also reflect flight to cash or 
other currencies. However, this possibility is likely only if the deposit insurance scheme is not 
credible or the confidence in the whole banking system has eroded. If the deposit insurance 
scheme is credible, any depositor willing to pay the penalty of early withdrawal of its uninsured 
deposits will shift to insured deposits at the same bank or elsewhere. Thus, such runs will most 
likely reflect a flight to insured deposits and no major credit crunch will result. If the deposit 
insurance scheme is not credible, however, the runs will also affect insured deposits. Thus the 
existence of uninsured deposits will not result in a banking panic, and if a panic does take place 
the insured deposits will not be immune either.  
 
Nevertheless, to minimize this risk, MODIS includes a system of endogenous supervision and 
capital regulations to strengthen the banking sector. As discussed below, under this mechanism, 
oversight and capital requirements would be intensified, depending on a bank’s interest rate 
spread, safety starts, and tier 1 ratio. These requirements improve the credibility of deposit 
insurance and reduce the risk of a flight to quality. Also, under MODIS, the rapidity of bank runs 
would be limited by the fact that, as just mentioned, only time deposits would be uninsured. This 
would give banks some more time to address the liquidity problem. Finally, it has to be 
recognized that the possibility of runs and credit crunches to a certain extent might be an 
inevitable consequence of restoring market discipline (Calomiris, 1999).  
 
2. No upper limit on the volume of tier 1 and tier 2 deposits 
 
The traditional argument for an upper bound on insured deposits per depositor is that the deposit 
insurance system should protect only the small and less-informed depositors, leaving large 
depositors to monitor banks and exercise market discipline. Under MODIS, insurance is not 
denied to large deposits. MODIS allows depositors, irrespective of their size of deposits, a choice 
as to whether or not to shoulder the burden of monitoring the banks they deal with. A 
sophisticated client may be able to monitor the banks, but under MODIS, that client has a choice 
to be involved in monitoring, take some risk, and receive a higher return, or take no risk and 
receive a lower return. In MODIS, then, the distinction is not between the level of deposits as to 
whether the marginal deposit receives protection. The level at which the deposit insurance kicks 
in is endogenous. It depends on the interest rate and the depositors’ behavior toward risk. This 
also marks the difference between the uninsured deposits in our proposal and the large-value 
CDs available in the United States that have a minimum denomination and have no protection 
above $100,000.  
 
3. No ceiling on interest rates 
 
Given that under MODIS there are no restrictions on the supply of either type of deposit by 
banks, there is a risk that competition for deposits could become destabilizing, inducing 
institutions (especially the undercapitalized or failing ones) to aggressively bid interest rates up 
to attract more deposits and finance risky projects. With regard to tier 2 deposits, it can be 
reasonably expected that banks would have limited incentive to engage in cut-throat competition.   - 13 - 
As mentioned above, the higher the spread between tier 2 and tier 1 deposit rates, the higher 
deposit insurance premia, capital requirements, and the intensity of supervision. Thus banks 
would not want to bid up their tier 2 interest rates and widen the margin with tier 1 deposit rates.  
Competition can, however, be aggressive for insured deposits, as the guarantee makes the supply 
of funds more elastic to rates of return (Matutes and Vives, 1996). Besides, banks’ appetite for 
risk can be particularly high if deposits are insured, as undercapitalized banks, which do not have 
much to lose, would be willing to attract insured deposits using high interest rates, and then 
invest the funds in high risk projects.
16 
 
In light of this possibility, it could be argued that a ceiling on the interest rate paid on insured 
deposits would be desirable. Apart from eliminating cut-throat competition among banks, a 
deposit interest rate ceiling would improve the profitability of banks and hence raise their 
franchise value. The increase in the franchise value would then lead to more prudent behavior 
(Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 1998, 2000).
17 Ceilings on deposit rates do exist in some 
countries and they did exist in the United States, under Regulation Q. 
 
However, MODIS does not include such a ceiling because of the well-known distortionary 
effects of interest rate caps and because they are usually circumvented in different ways. 
Moreover, if the ceilings are decided by the association of banks, there will be collusion on the 
cap. If the ceilings are set by the government, this would lead to distortionary behavior: banks 
would try to circumvent the limits, or to compete on nonpecuniary services to depositors.  
 
Rather than an interest rate cap, MODIS requires banks with a larger volume of tier 1 deposits to 
pay a higher insurance premium. This premium should be set in such a way as to reduce the 
incentives for destabilizing competition. To further reduce the possibility of destabilizing 
excessive competition, MODIS relates the intensity of supervision and capital adequacy 
requirement positively to the tier 1 ratio.  
 
4. Disclosure requirement 
 
The disclosure and public display of some financial statistics are essential since the degree of 
moral hazard is directly related to the extent of transparency of the riskiness of banks’ portfolios 
(Dewatripoint and Tirole, 1993a; Matutes and Vives, 2000). If banks’ performance and asset risk 
are not observable, banks will take the highest risk possible even in the absence of deposit 
insurance (Dewatripoint and Tirole, 1993a; Matutes and Vives, 2000). As a minimum, MODIS 
requires the banks to inform the public about their overall health and conformity with the 
                                                 
16 Some evidence for the behavior in the case of Argentina is provided in Schumacher (2000). 
17 Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz show that in the presence of excessive bank risk-taking 
behavior, it is impossible to implement any Pareto efficient outcome using just capital 
requirements as the tool of prudential regulation. Instead, any Pareto efficient outcome can be 
implemented by a combination of capital requirements and deposit rate controls.   - 14 - 
prudential standards (safety stars), their behavior toward risk and vulnerability to bank runs. The 
first is gauged by the bank’s safety stars and the last  by its tier 1 ratio. Transparency with regard 
to these statistics would allow depositors both to choose the banks that conform to their level of 
risk aversion, and to determine the distribution of their funds between tier 1 and tier 2 deposits.
18 
A bank with a low tier 1 ratio would be vulnerable to bank runs, therefore, depositors would 
exercise caution when a low tier 1 ratio is observed. Some would decide to choose tier 1, rather 
than tier 2 deposits, or switch to another bank. In this way, the market would determine the 
equilibrium tier 1 ratio for each bank. 
 
5. The insurance premium 
 
To be fair, and avoid good banks cross subsidizing unsound institutions, insurance contributions 
have to be risk-adjusted. Also, as discussed in Section II, risk-based pricing of insurance could 
further alleviate moral hazard. A critical issue related to the introduction of risk-adjusted premia, 
though, is how to price banks’ contributions. This issue has received attention in the literature 
(Merton 1977, 1978; Acharya and Dreyfus,1989; Kerfriden and Rochet, 1993). Acharya and 
Dreyfus (1989), in particular, show that the optimal deposit insurance premium is a non-
decreasing function of the deposit to asset ratio, and a monotonically increasing function of the 
risk of bank investment. Consistent with this theoretical result, under MODIS, a bank’s 
contribution to the insurance fund would be increasing in the amount of insured deposits, and in 
bank risk.  
 
What is, however, an adequate measure of bank risk? Banks’ assets generally embody private 
information, so that, in practice, it is difficult to link deposit insurance premia directly to banks’ 
risk profile. Therefore, under MODIS the spread between interest rates on tier 2 and tier 1 
deposits is considered as an indicator of risk. This indicator is easily observable and cannot be 
manipulated by banks.  
 
Also, to reduce the detrimental effect of banks increasing their asset risk after the deposit 
insurance terms have been established, revisions of the contributions should be undertaken 
regularly, and more recent data should be given higher weight in determining the premium. As 
data on deposits and interest spreads are readily available, these periodic revisions could be 
carried out easily. 
 
 
                                                 
18 The publication of financial statements that use fair value accounting would significantly 
enhance the disclosure requirements and the monitoring of banks by depositors. Even though the 
extension of fair value accounting to loans in banks’ balance sheet is still subject to debate 
among standard setters, bankers, and policymakers, the British Bankers Association has 
advocated the disclosure of an estimate of their fair value when banks publish their financial 
statements. See Chisnall. 
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where,   
 
P  is the deposit insurance premium, which would be calculated and paid once a year; 
I  is tier 1 deposits (calculated on the basis of the weighted average of the monthly values of  
insured deposits during the previous year); 
1 r  is the weighted average interest rate on tier 1 deposits;  
2 r  is the weighted interest rate on tier 2 deposits, and  
s is the spread between weighted average interest rates on tier 2 and tier 1 deposits.  
0 α >  should be determined by simulation exercises, incorporating the default risk, to ensure 
adequate funding.  
 
The above formulation for the premium charge has a number of  implications. First, if the spread 
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This possibility is highly unlikely, however. Clearly, a bank that wishes to attract tier 2 deposits 
will have to quote a positive spread. Moreover, if the interest rate offered on tier 1 deposits is 
equal to or higher than that on tier 2 deposits, there will be simply no incentive for depositors to 
place their funds in tier 2 (noninsured) accounts. By offering a zero or negative spread, the bank 
reveals its preference for having only insured deposits. However,  the higher cost of the premium 
required if all deposits are insured, the additional capital requirement, and the heightened 
supervision it necessitates under MODIS will most likely rule out such a preference.  
 
Second, this formula allows a nonlinear positive relationship between the insurance premium and 
the bank’s quotes of tier 1 interest rate and the spread. Such a formula would help reduce the risk 
of destabilizing competition for tier 1 deposits (discussed above) because higher interest rates on 
tier 1 (everything else being equal) would lead to a higher premium. Also, given that premium 
contributions would increase with the spread(s) between tier 1 and tier 2 deposits, a bank’s 
incentive to use a high spread to attract tier 2 deposits would also be curtailed. 
   - 16 - 
Third, a bank that has no insured deposits will not pay a premium, but even small amounts of 
insured deposits entails insurance cost. It could be argued that banks with a large ratio of tier 2 
deposits are most likely also those perceived to be more safe and sound. Requiring such banks to 
pay a premium would amount to cross-subsidization. However, there is little doubt that all banks 
benefit  when the financial system is sound, which would allow the payment, clearing, and 
settlement system to function efficiently. Payment system efficiency is a public good for which 
all banks, including those perceived to be safe and sound should be required to pay. 
 
6. Supplementary capital requirements 
 
As interest rate spreads, safety stars, and the share of tier 1 deposits are all indicators of a bank’s 
risk, more stringent capital regulations should be set for depository institutions that exhibit high 
spreads, unfavorable supervisory ratings, and a low tier 1 ratio. The additional capital 
requirements would strengthen riskier banks by providing them with more capital cushion in the 
event of losses. But this requirement means that even a bank that is adequately capitalized and in 
good financial health would have to increase its capital simply as a result of a change in interest 
rate spread in order to remain in compliance with MODIS. The required capital increase for this 
purpose should be well defined in terms of  the change in the interest rate spread, tier 1 ratio, and 
safety stars. In order for this requirement to serve as an effective tool for deterring excessive 
risk-taking by banks, there should be no doubts about the binding nature of the obligation. 
Therefore, the required increase in the capital base should be mandatory and not at the discretion 
of the supervisory authority.  
 
7. Intensive supervision 
 
Dealing with supervision is costly for banks. The regulations should make it clear that the 
intensity of supervision is explicitly linked to the tier 1 ratio, the safety stars, and interest rate 
spreads. The stars would be awarded based on off-site monitoring and on-site examinations by 
the supervisory agency. The purpose of this MODIS requirement is again to reduce banks 
incentives for risk-taking, and for bidding up tier 2 deposit rates to attract depositors. Banks 
could then set their targeted tier 1 ratio and improve on their safety to minimize supervision. 
 
The idea of introducing a form of endogenous supervision is not new. For example, the U.S. 
Federal Deposit Improvement Act of 1991 imposed the requirement that supervisors take a series 
of mandatory and optional actions as a bank’s capital adequacy declines (Prompt Corrective 
Action (PCA) requirement). However, a weakness of this approach is that, in determining capital 
ratios, it relies on book values, which might differ from the market values (Evanoff and Wall, 
2000, 2001), and be subject to manipulation by banks. In contrast, a system of endogenous 
supervision based on interest rate spreads and the tier 1 ratio has the advantage that these 
variables are objective, market-based measures of risk, which do not rely on questionable 
accounting rules and cannot be manipulated.
19 
                                                 
19 In the same vein, in the context of mandatory subordinated debt proposals to enhance market 
discipline, some economists have recommended using sub-debt yield spreads as triggers for 
(continued…)   - 17 - 
To further enhance supervision, under MODIS, and following the FDIC model, the deposit 
insurance agency would have responsibility for banking supervision as well. This institutional 
setup could prevent the agency problem that would arise if monitoring of banks’ risk-taking is 
delegated to a separate agency (Cordella and Levy Yeyati, 1998). 
 
8. Should joining MODIS be compulsory? 
 
Joining MODIS amounts to supplying insured deposits. The choice of what products to offer 
should be left entirely to the bank. A bank can decide on the basis of its own cost structure, risk 
aversion profile, and market conditions whether it would like to supply insured deposits. 
However, under MODIS, banks are required to quote interest rates on both types of deposits. 
Therefore, a bank that does not wish to participate in MODIS will offer a below-market interest 
rate on tier 1 deposits. The decision not to offer insured deposits could have important financial 
implications for the bank. Offering only uninsured deposits raises the additional capital 
requirement for the bank as discussed earlier, since the effective spread between tier 2 and tier 1 
deposit rates becomes larger. Moreover, it will become more and more costly for a bank to fund 
its operations entirely on the basis of the higher-cost tier 2 deposits. Also, a bank offering only 
uninsured deposits will have to behave much more prudently, which means its income from 
loans may be reduced (since it has to lend to good customers who pay less interest). These 
conditions militate against opting out of MODIS. 
 
B.   The Optimal Level of Coverage Under MODIS 
 
1. A simple model of bank run and moral hazard 
 
The central message of MODIS is that the deposit insurance scheme should be market-oriented. 
The insurance coverage (the tier 1 ratio) is determined by the market and hence could be time 
varying and bank specific. This is in contrast with the current schemes worldwide in which the 
insurance limits are set by the governments. Are these limits appropriate? What determines how 
high they should be? The following model sheds light on this aspect.  
 
We assume that there is a representative bank. Let  z be the bank’s ratio of insured deposits to 
total deposits. We make the following assumptions.  
 
(A1)  The probability of a bank run, π , is a decreasing function of z :  '( ) <0 z π . 




( ) with probability  ( ) (when bank run)
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supervisory discipline under PCA. Such a proposal has been endorsed by the U.S. Shadow 
Financial Regulatory Committee (Evanoff and Wall, 2001).    - 18 - 
 with  12 0  and  '( ) 0. z ββ σ ≤< >  
 (A3)  Social welfare is increasing in the bank’s mean return,  , µ  and decreasing in the standard 
deviation,  , σ  of the bank’s returns: 
 
  12 ( , ), and  0, 0. UU U µσ ><  
 
These assumptions are all intuitive. (A1) states that as z increases, that is, as more deposits are 
insured, there will be less chance of a bank run. (A2) states that as more deposits are insured, 
there is less market discipline and hence the bank would take more risk aiming at a higher mean 
return. The mean return depends on the risk banks take and on whether there is a bank run. In the 
rest of the paper, we set, without loss of generality,  12 0 and  0. ββ β = => (A3) is standard and 
used frequently in the literature. 
 
We need to characterize the condition that determines the socially optimal ratio of insured 
deposits to total deposits, 
*. z  There could be two formulations of social optimal problems. The 
first is to maximize 
 
  ( ) ( , ( )) (1 ( )) ( ( ), ( )). ff z Ur z zUr z z πσ π β σ σ +− +  
 
The second is to maximize 
 
  () ( ) (1 ( ))( ( )), ( ) . ff Uz r z r z z ππ β σ σ +− +  
The two formulations will give similar results in general and will give the same results if 
(, ) U µ σ is separable and is linear in  . µ  In the following, we will use the second formulation for 
simplicity. 
 
We now find out how U  changes with  z : 
 
  () 12 ( 1 () ) ' () ' () () ' ()
dU
Uz z z z U z
dz




Assumptions (A1) and (A2) imply that the first term is positive and the second is negative. This 
captures mathematically the trade-off of deposit insurance. The benefit is two fold: it reduces the 
chance of a bank run,  1 '( ) ( ) Uz z πβ σ −×  and it raises the expected return when there is no bank 
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where  00  and  θ σ  are positive,  0 01 π ≤≤  and 00 . 5 η ≤ ≤ . The last parameter restriction, 
00 . 5 η ≤≤ , is a sufficient condition to guarantee that the social welfare function is concave in 
reduced form in  [0,1] z∈ . 
 
Note that z is not a random but a choice variable. It is selected by the market. Once z is given, 
the probability of the event of a bank run is given by  () z π , and the probability of no bank runs, 
by 1( ) z π − . The above specification of  () z π  implies that as z increases, namely more insurance 
coverage, the probability of  bank run decreases.  
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The quadratic nature of  / dU dz means that in order to have an interior solution 
* 01 z << , we 
must have, 
 
  [] 00 0 (1 ) 2 0 βη π π θ η σ − +− >   (3) 
 
  0 (1 ) 0 βθ η σ − +<   (4) 
 
We have the following proposition. 
  
Proposition: If  [] 00 0 (1 ) 2 0 βη π π θ η σ −+ − ≤ , there should be no deposit insurance. If  
0 (1 ) 0 βθ η σ −+ ≥ , there should be full insurance(no uninsured deposits). Otherwise, there 
should be partial insurance. 
 
Among the actual deposit insurance schemes, there is, at one extreme, New Zealand, with an 
explicit denial of deposit insurance. At the other extreme, there are a number of crisis countries 
offering blanket insurance coverage. Are these choices consistent with what the above model 
suggests? 
 
According to the model, an explicit denial of deposit insurance is optimal if 
[] 00 0 (1 ) 2 0 βη π π θ η σ −+ − ≤ . This condition holds when the benefit of a reduction in bank runs 
as a result of introducing an infinitesimal deposit insurance coverage,  [ ] 00 (1 ) 2 β ηπ π −+ , is 
smaller than the cost due to moral hazard of the coverage,  0 θησ . As we can see, this requires 
0 and  σ θ  to be large. In other words banks should be taking “large” risks and the society should 
be highly averse toward risk-taking by banks. In this case, it is optimal to have no deposit 
insurance, because the society wants to make sure that banks take minimum risk even though this 
means that the chance of a bank run could be substantial. The applicability of these conditions to 
New Zealand is an empirical question, but it would be reasonable to suggest that in developed 
countries neither  0 and  σ θ  is likely to be very large. 
 
On the other hand, according to the above model, full insurance is optimal if  0 (1 ) 0 βθ η σ −+ ≥ . 
This holds if there is low risk aversion, or if the marginal expected return of banks’ risk-taking, 
β , is high. It also holds if  0(1 ) σ η +  is small. Note that  0(1 ) σ η + is the standard deviation of 
returns to bank loans under full insurance. Small  0(1 ) σ η + means that little moral hazard is 
associated with full insurance. Neither of these cases is likely to be true for crisis countries. 
Hence, the model suggests that full insurance for crisis countries is unlikely to be optimal. One 
may argue that during a crisis, the probability of bank runs is very high. This could be captured 
in our model by an increase in parameter  0 π . Wouldn’t this call for full insurance? The answer is 
no. The increase in  0 π  will indeed raise the level of protection, since 
*
0 / dz dπ >0 as proved   - 21 - 
below, but not all the way to full insurance, because the condition for full insurance, 
0 (1 ) 0 βθ η σ −+ ≥ , is independent of  0 π .  
 
We now assume that in most countries, conditions (3) and (4) hold so that the optimal insurance 
coverage is 
* 01 z << . We are interested in how the parameters  00 ,, a n d   θ σπ η  influence  
* z . 
  
From equation (2), it is easy to see that the more risk averse the society (the higher θ ) or the 
more risk-taking are the banks (the higher 0 σ ), the more market discipline the society desires, 
and hence the smaller the insurance coverage, 
* z . As for 
**
0 /  and  / dz d dz d π η , our intuition 
says that 
*
0 / dz dπ >0 (that is, a higher probability of bank runs raises the society’s need for more 
deposit protection), and 
* / dz dη <0 (a higher ηmeans a higher marginal effectiveness of market 
discipline exercised by uninsured depositors, hence the optimal level of insurance coverage 
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2. The experiences of the United States and other countries in light of the above model 
 
Beginning in the early 1980s, with the deregulation of the banking sector in the United States 
under way, banks competed more intensively for deposits and hence had to take more risk, which 
meant a higher  0 σ . According to the above model, the optimal rate of insurance coverage should 
be lower in response to this higher  0 σ . In contrast, the FDIC insurance coverage limit was 
actually raised in 1980 from $40,000 to $100,000. Part of the increase was due to the fact that 
high inflation up to 1980 had eroded the real value of the insurance coverage. But even in real 
terms, there was a substantial jump in coverage (Figure 1). According to the above model, this 
jump in insurance coverage was a wrong policy, unless we assume that the pre-1980 level of 
coverage was substantially below the optimal level. However, it is difficult to determine whether 
or not this was the case, because the government, rather than the market, set the coverage ratio 
and there is no indication that the government had optimality in mind when setting the pre-1980 
ratio. It is therefore difficult to know in which period policy erred.
 20 Under MODIS, the market 
determines the optimal level of insurance coverage. 
                                                 
20 In retrospect, the jump of the insurance limit from $40,000 to $100,000 may have arguably 
contributed to the severity of the subsequent Savings and Loans crisis.   - 22 - 
 
 
Figure 1. The Real Value of Coverage Has Declined Since 1980
 
 
Source: FDIC (2000). 
 
 
The U.S. experience may be an example of too much deposit protection, but what can we say 
about insurance limits worldwide? According to Garcia (2000), deposit insurance coverage is 1.4 
times GDP on average in Europe, 3.0 times in Asia, 3.4 times in the Western Hemisphere, 3.5 
times in the Middle East, and 5.5 times in Africa. Since financial markets and market 
participants’ approach to investment is less sophisticated in developing countries compared to 
the developed countries, it may be safe to assume that: (a) market discipline is weaker (a smaller 
η), and (b), in the absence of deposit insurance, bank runs are more likely (a higher value of  0 π ) 
in the developing countries than in the developed countries. The above model suggests that as a 
result of the smaller η and the higher  0 π , the optimal insurance coverage is higher. In other 
words, since the uninsured depositors cannot effectively monitor risk-taking by banks, it makes 
more sense to raise insurance protection so as to reduce the likelihood of bank runs. Thus, the 
generally higher level of deposit insurance coverage in the African countries compared to the 
European countries is justifiable. However, again, with the governments setting the insurance 
limits, it is not possible to establish the optimality of the absolute levels of the insurance 
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3.  Possible extensions of the model 
 
The model  presented above abstracts from  likely contagion effect of bank runs. To bring back 
the contagion effect, we could assume that the probability of a bank run for bank i is  ( , ) i z z π , 
where  i z  is bank i’s ratio of insured deposits to total deposits and z is the average of that ratio 
over all banks, and,  
 
12 0 and  0 ππ < <  
    
These conditions state that (a) the higher the fraction of insured deposits in bank i, the lower will 
be its bank run probability and (b) the higher is the average fraction of insured deposits over all 
the banks, the more stable will be the banking system and hence the lower will be the bank-run 
probability for any individual bank i.  
 
We could then solve a pseudo social optimization problem to derive the first-order conditions 
and then substitute  i z z = . This solution is different from that of a true social planner who would 
take  i z z =  into account when deriving the first-order conditions. The true social planner would 
recognize that an increase in one bank's insurance coverage would generate the additional benefit 
of lowering the bank-run probability for all other banks. As a result, the social planner would 
prefer a higher insurance coverage than the pseudo planner. Therefore, the possibility of 
contagion could create a case for a government subsidy on insured deposit accounts in order to 
raise the insurance coverage to socially optimal level. 
 
Another dimension along which the model can be extended is to introduce the interaction 
between banks’ risk-taking and the supervision by the deposit insurance agency. A suitable 
framework for this analysis would be a Stackelberg game in which the deposit insurance agency 
is the leader and the banks are the followers. The extended model could then be used to discuss 
the optimal threshold of tier 1 ratio that triggers supervisory actions. 
 
IV.   COMPARISON WITH THE SUBORDINATED DEBT PROPOSAL AND THE FDIC MODEL 
 
A.   Comparing MODIS and Subordinated Debt Proposals 
 
MODIS shares some features with the mandatory subordinated debt proposals discussed in 
Section III. Both MODIS and sub-debt proposals rely on uninsured claims to enhance market 
discipline and consider the spread between the interest rates on the uninsured and insured claims 
as an accurate measure of a bank’s risk. This spread is a factor in the determination of the deposit 
insurance premium, and can serve to trigger supervisory actions.
21   
                                                 
21 For example, Calomiris (1999) recommends that banks should pay an insurance premium 
which varies month-to-month with the actual interest rate spread they pay above the treasury bill 
rate on subordinated debt.   - 24 - 
The main difference between MODIS and the subordinated debt proposals is that the former 
relies almost entirely on market forces in determining the amount of insured deposits. Whereas 
under MODIS, the uninsured share of deposits and the interest rate spread would be 
endogenously determined by the market, sub-debt proposals envisage the introduction of various 
restrictions on banking activities. These restrictions include: ratio of sub-debt to total assets,
22 
sub-debt issues of two years maturity, 1/24 of which would mature each month Calomiris (1999), 
and the requirement that, at the time it is placed, the interest rate on this sub-debt should be 
within a predetermined limit.  
 
The MODIS proposal also eliminates an important disadvantage of the sub-debt proposals. 
Under the latter, when a bank is poorly capitalized, subordinated debt becomes de facto equity. 
In that event, sub-debt holders have no incentives to impose discipline on banks (Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1993b). This would not be the case in MODIS, because uninsured depositors would 
still be senior to other creditors. 
 
Another factor that suggests that MODIS would work better than subordinated debt proposals is 
that there are indications that the uninsured deposit market develops faster and deeper than the 
sub-debt market. In the United States, for example, the uninsured deposit market is much larger 
than the sub-debt market (Lang and Robertson, 2000). Also, there are doubts on whether 
compulsory sub-debt issues would be feasible for small banks. Given the relative lack of 
complexity of small banks, and the sizable financial burden of issuing sub-debt securities, it is 
likely that only large banks would be able to issue subordinate debt in amounts sufficient to 
ensure a liquid market for the debt.
23 Therefore, most proposals for mandatory sub-debt advocate 
the requirement only for large banks.
24 On the contrary, uninsured deposits can easily be issued 
by large and small banks alike. In fact, in the United States, uninsured deposits are already an 
important source of funds for small banks: while only a few small banks have issued sub-debt, as 
of mid-1999, uninsured deposits accounted for more than 13 percent of total deposits at banking 
institutions with less than $100 million in assets (Lang and Robertson, 2000). Furthermore, the 
MODIS proposal is likely to be more suitable for developing countries than the sub-debt 
proposals, because offering uninsured deposits requires a lower level of market sophistication, 
and it is less expensive for banks, than issuing subordinated debt. 
                                                 
22 The Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee recommends 2 percent as the minimum ratio of 
subordinated debt to assets. 
23 For instance, in the United States, while almost 90 percent of bank holding companies with 
assets of $10 billion or more had issued subordinated debt in 1998, only 6 percent of bank 
holding companies with assets between $50 million and $500 million had done so (Lang and 
Robertson, 2000). 
24 For instance, the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2000) suggests exempting banks 
with assets under $10 billion.   - 25 - 
B.   Comparing MODIS and the U.S. Deposit Insurance System 
 
As recognized by the FDIC, the current U.S. deposit insurance system has a number of problems 
(FDIC, 2000), including fairness, business cycle considerations, and effectiveness of the cap on 
insured deposits. These shortcomings have prompted a review of the system by the FDIC. This 





The FDIC rules can be characterized as unfair for several reasons. During the first 50 years of the 
FDIC, every insured institution was assessed the same insurance premium, which was 3.3 to 8.3 
basis points, depending on the economic condition (FDIC, 2000). This method of assessment 
appeared unfair because the good banks were effectively subsidizing bad ones. Therefore, after 
the mid-1990s, the FDIC switched to risk-adjusted insurance contributions. In the new system, 
institutions that are best rated are not required to pay deposit insurance premiums at all. As a 
consequence, only a small share of depository institutions pay contributions to the insurance 
fund. For example, only 7 percent of all banks and thrifts paid a premium at the end of 1999. 
Thus for highly-rated banks, which can raise their insured deposits without paying a premium, 
the marginal cost of deposit insurance is zero. Moreover, the assessment of banks’ portfolios is 
based on the CAMELS rating system, which provides useful qualitative information on the 
banks, but is a poor leading indicator of bank failure. If only CAMELS 4- and 5- rated banks 
were considered, bank regulators would have only identified 46 percent of the banks that failed 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Gup, 1998). In fact, the FDIC’s most costly bank failures in 
recent years have occurred rather abruptly among institutions that had consistently reported 
strong earnings and capital (FDIC, 2000, p. 17). 
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, α > 0. This implies that a strong bank, able to attract deposits while 
maintaining a lower spread than a weak bank, would pay a lower premium. MODIS is therefore 
fairer for the strong banks compared to the FDIC practice in its first 50 years. Compared to the 
FDIC’s recent practice, MODIS  helps reduce the disadvantage of having a small percentage of 
depository institutions bearing the entire burden of funding the FDIC.  
 
2. Business cycle considerations 
 
The MODIS formula for calculating insurance contributions gives the premium the role of an 
automatic stabilizer. During a boom, banks compete more intensely in raising the spread to 
attract deposits and fund more adventurous projects. Thus the premium would increase. During a 
recession, the opposite is true. In this way the deposit insurance fund would accumulate 
insurance premium receipts during good times when banks can afford it, while in bad times it 
would put a lower burden on banks’ resources. This is in contrast to the current FDIC practice,   - 26 - 
whereby banks are charged with a high insurance premium to fund insurance losses when they 
can least afford it (FDIC, 2000, p. 5).  
 
3. Effectiveness of a cap on insured deposits 
 
Under the current FDIC regulations, the coverage limit is $100,000 per person, per institution, 
but complexities of the laws can make the limit greater in practice. The statutory limit can be 
circumvented by spreading deposits across various institutions or different types of accounts. 
Therefore, the FDIC emphasis in protecting small depositors turns out to be socially wasteful, as 
large depositors spend time and energy to overcome the insurance cap by opening multiple 
accounts using names of relatives. 
 
MODIS would allow savers with different degrees of risk-aversion to obtain a different degree of 
coverage. In this sense, it is a proper insurance mechanism. At the same time, by offering 
alternative combinations of risk and returns on deposits, it would give depositors different 
investment options. Depositors would weigh the benefit of a higher rate on tier 2, against the 
safety in tier 1. They would compare a profile of interests quoted by banks, and their tier 1 ratio, 
plus the safety stars awarded by the banking regulator. Then, they would decide in which bank to 
put their money, and whether to opt for tier 1 or tier 2 deposits. In contrast, in a limited deposit 
insurance system, with a uniform cap on insurance coverage, savers cannot choose their desired 
degree of coverage, nor can they decide among alternative combinations of risk and returns on 
deposits.  
 
Moreover, under MODIS, the coverage limit would be determined by the market, as the market 
would set the equilibrium tier 1 ratio for each bank, which would vary over time. Instead, in a 
limited deposit insurance scheme, like the current U.S. system, the statutory coverage cap is 
completely arbitrary. Also, as the limit is set in nominal terms, its real value diminishes 
continuously. Finally, under MODIS, agents are responsible for their own actions. Depositors 
would be aware that when they choose an uninsured deposit to enjoy higher interest returns, they 
would be taking a risk. They will have no one to blame, but themselves, if the banks that took 
their deposits failed. 
 
V.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
An ideal deposit insurance system strikes a delicate balance between the benefit of a safety net 
and the cost of moral hazard. The deposit guarantee schemes in effect in the IMF member 
countries do not seem to achieve this balance. Most countries have adopted some form of  partial 
deposit insurance system, with little or no market-related features, that suffers from the 
shortcomings explained in this paper. There are also a few extreme cases of explicit blanket 
guarantees (adopted mainly by countries during crises and by Japan), implicit (blanket?) 
guarantees (China), and explicit denial (New Zealand). The problems associated with blanket 
guarantees are well recognized by the countries adopting them, and in any case, these types of 
guarantees are explicitly announced to be temporary. The effectiveness of the explicit denial 
approach still remains to be seen. The banking system in New Zealand, which is largely foreign   - 27 - 
owned, is doing well now, but it remains to be seen whether the explicit denial of deposit 
insurance can handle a crisis situation in the future.  
 
This paper has argued that within the wide spectrum of the possible safety nets, the optimal 
system should be determined by the market. Based on this principle, the paper proposes a system 
of deposit insurance that minimizes distortions and embodies fairness and credibility, two 
characteristics that are essential for a viable and effective deposit insurance system.  
 
MODIS, as proposed in this paper, is designed such that the bank that takes more risk pays a 
higher insurance premium. There is no direct subsidization across banks. MODIS is also 
designed to allow a choice of risk and return combinations to bank clients. A person who puts 
funds in a bank’s uninsured account in search of higher returns would have to monitor the bank 
closely and has no one to blame if the bank fails. In this sense, MODIS is fair. 
 
MODIS is credible and market friendly. The power of the market lies in its role to aggregate 
individual pieces of information. Asymmetric and incomplete information may hinder the market 
at times but no regulation or supervision can effectively replace its function. MODIS relies on 
individuals to decide how to allocate their funds, among banks, and between insured and 
uninsured accounts. MODIS also relies on the bankers themselves to decide how competitive 
they want to be.
25 The fact that MODIS only covers the insured account and that the intensity of 
supervision responds to risk evaluation means that the insurance payout burden under MODIS is 
likely to be manageable and hence the system is credible. 
                                                 
25 A different, and less market-friendly, two-tier deposit insurance proposal is outlined in Walker 
and Hoontrakul (2001). The proposal’s main weakness is that it makes deposit insurance 
compulsory for small deposits but voluntary for large deposits.    - 28 - 
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